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In the present paper we want to argue that Wearable Robots (i.e., technological devices 
used to restore the possibility of walking and re-establishing “normal” human life) should 
not necessarily be anthropomorphic, in order to respect human autonomy, freedom, and 
nature. Moreover, we argue that this non-anthropomorphism does not necessarily lead to 
transhumanism. To adequately discuss this topic, we are called to consider various aspects 
embedded in the question: the difference between restoring and enhancing, i.e., the differ-
ence between considering human nature as normative, or will (or wish) as the main criterion 
of choice; the difference between exceeding the limits of human nature (i.e., human en-
hancement) and restoring human functions; and, finally, the nature of the function itself. We 
will introduce a “weak” notion of autonomy and freedom, dealing with rehabilitation and 
motility, in order to assess the use of Wearable Robots in rehabilitative medicine. Hence we 
will argue that the less constraints that patients have, the freer they are. All these aspects also 
imply an anthropological and ecological view, since they have to do with the relationship of 
the human being with its environment.
Keywords: human ecology, Wearable Robots, Transhumanism, anthropomorphism, Arne 
Næss, environment.
RESUMO
No presente artigo, queremos discutir como o desenho de Wearable Robots, ou seja, 
dispositivos tecnológicos utilizados para restaurar a possibilidade de caminhar e para res-
tabelecer a vida humana “normal”, a fim de respeitar a autonomia, a liberdade ea natureza 
humana, não devem necessariamente ser antropomórfico, não é necessário que conduza 
a transumanismo. Para discutir adequadamente este tema, vamos considerar vários aspec-
tos da questão: a diferença entre restaurar e melhorar, ou seja, a diferença entre considerar 
a natureza humana como normativa, ou a vontade (ou os desejos) como o principal critério 
de escolha; a diferença entre a exceder os limites da natureza humana (ou seja, o human 
enhancement), e restaurar funções humanas; a natureza da função em si. Vamos introduzir 
uma noção “fraca” de autonomia e liberdade, que lidam com a reabilitação e mobilidade, 
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Introduction: Wearable robots, 
autonomy, and freedom
In this paper we want to argue that Wearable Robots, 
i.e., technological devices used to restore the possibility of 
walking and re-establishing “normal” human life, in order to 
respect human nature and to be ecological, should not nec-
essarily be anthropomorphic, which in turn does not neces-
sarily lead to transhumanism. First, we need to clarify what 
we mean by the term “exoskeleton”. Very briefly, an exoskel-
eton is a robotic wearable skeleton, designed on the basis of 
the human body’s shape and functions in order to adapt to its 
movements perfectly.
Ultimately, it is an external support that guarantees 
freedom of moving and walking, perfect adherence to the hu-
man body, and good controllability. Basically, “an exoskeleton 
consists of a metal frame, sensors, actuators, and control elec-
tronics” (Kumar et al., 2012, p. 2034), and is nowadays used 
in several fields, “including power augmentation for military 
or medical assistance, rehabilitation and in haptic interfaces” 
(De Rossi et al., 2010). Let us clarify that we will only refer to 
exoskeletons intended for assistive and rehabilitation purpos-
es, and specifically on their design, while neglecting, for the 
sake of this paper, the moral implications of powered exoskel-
etons’ use for military purposes (Cornwall, 2015).
From a general point of view, in fact, “a number of dis-
orders affect motor patterns in the limbs. […] They result in 
muscular weakness and contractures. People with these dis-
orders significantly depend on their caregivers for personal 
care” (Kumar et al., 2010, p. 2033). The aim of exoskeletons in 
rehabilitative therapy, therefore, is to help patients to recover 
their ability to move and walk with autonomy and freedom 
(Li et al., 2015; Arene and Hidler, 2009). We also want to 
emphasize that these supporting devices are used only for a 
limited time: the subject wears the robot only during ther-
apy sessions, and under medical supervision. In this context 
Wearable Robots (henceforth simply “WRs”) are meant to 
provide assistance as necessary (and not to inhibit voluntary 
movements), and to help the patients to complete tasks that 
they would not be able to perform autonomously.
These two dimensions are particularly important in 
determining the design of WRs (Sergi et al., 2011; van den 
Kieeboma et al., 2011), since their aim is to rehabilitate hu-
man motility whenever possible. In this regard, we could 
say that in WRs the interaction between human beings and 
robots is completely dynamic; the central subject is still the 
patientnot the robotand biomechanics would not be 
considered a mere constraint.
For now it is possible to conclude that the dimension of 
autonomy effectively emerges from the dynamic interaction 
between patients and their environment. With a simplistic 
argument, we can state that the fewer constraints or barriers 
(WHO, 2001) patients have, the more autonomous they are. 
These constraints are, properly speaking, environmental or 
physical (bodily) barriers that prevent individuals from car-
rying out their functions (WHO, 2001), i.e., in this particular 
case, the function of walking. To use a well-known image in 
philosophy of education analogously, “Autonomy”, here, is a 
“weak notion” (the complete opposite of a “strong notion” of 
autonomy, as Winch suggestsWinch, 2005, p. 68-71), and 
means the capacity to perform a function without any sub-
stantial constraint, external or internal, i.e., it has to do with 
human illnesses and health (Carel, 2014). 
This implies a view of the relationship between human 
beings and their environment very close to that expressed by 
the Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss: the human being is a 
significant part of the environment, and its relation with its 
environment is essential to it. Næss (1989, p. 164) thus wrote: 
The identity of the individual, ‘that I am 
something’, is developed through inter-
action with a broad manifold, organic and 
inorganic. There is no completely isolat-
able I, no isolatable social unit. To distance 
oneself from nature and the ‘natural’ is to 
distance oneself from a part of that which 
the I is built up of. Its ‘identity’, ‘what the 
individual I is’, and thereby sense of self and 
self–respect, are broken down. Some milieu 
factors, e.g. mother, father, family, one’s 
first companions, play a central role in the 
development of an I, but so do home and 
the surroundings of home.
Conceiving the human being as an ecological being, i.e., 
as a being that has significant relations with its environment, 
helps us to reframe the notion of corporeity (Russo, 2012): in-
deed, we can no longer say that the environment starts where 
the boundary of our skin ends, because we live an environment 
much more than we live in it.
WRs would thus function as facilitators, as they are 
used in order to remove existing internal barriers within the 
human body (not the ontological limits, obviously), and bar-
riers emerging in the human’s relation with its environment. 
Hence the removal of these barriers would probably facilitate 
a fim de avaliar o uso de Wearable Robots na medicina de reabilitação. Por isso vamos 
argumentar que as menos restrições os pacientes têm, mais livres que são. Todos estes 
aspectos implicam também uma ideia antropológica e ecológico, já que têm a ver com a 
relação do ser humano com seu ambiente.
Palavras-chave: ecologia humana, wearable robots, transhumanismo, antropomorfismo, 
Arne Næss, ambiente.
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patients’ interaction with the external world, empowering 
their ability to respond to environmental stimuli. 
As we have pointed out, all these aspects have something 
to do with the notion of autonomy, or to be more precise, with 
a relational characterization of autonomy, since the human 
being cannot easily be conceived as a being separated from 
its environment. Therefore, this elementary characterization 
of autonomy is actually closer to Plessner’s notion of “adapt-
ability” (Plessner, 1975) and its basic aspect, the animal “cen-
trality”. According to Plessner, human beings swing between 
“centrality” and “exocentricity”, between having their centre 
within themselves and, at the same time, outside themselves. 
Non-human animals and human beings share this ability to 
react to environmental stimuli, which is “centrality”. This 
first aspect represents the logical condition of possibility of 
the second aspect, the exocentricity, i.e., “the ability of human 
beings to adopt an attitude toward themselves, a capacity for 
self-reflection, which at the same time is the basis for the hu-
man ability to stand back from things and treat them as ob-
jects, as things” (Pannenberg, 2004, p. 37). 
Indeed the body is our first “instrument” of contact 
with the environment. One of the most important features of 
the body is self-motility, which plays a role for the body that 
self-consciousness plays for the mind. With reference to the 
notion of pre-reflective intentional “motility” outlined by Mer-
leau-Ponty (Reuter, 1999; Kelly, 2002), we want to stress “the 
intentional character of movement: if motility is fundamental, 
it is because it accomplishes the transcendence of conscious-
ness toward the world in a manner that is anchored in incar-
nation, not in thought” (Carman and Hansen, 2005, p. 245).
To be clear, we can temporarily conclude that WRs, in so 
far as they help human beings in maintaining their autonomy, 
assist them in recovering basic functions (in particular “mo-
tility”); furthermore, since they remove barriers in the human 
relation to the environment, they facilitate the achievement 
of noble purposes and the “humanization” of human nature. 
Following Næss (1984, p. 9), our hypothesis here is that “each 
life form has its own nature, which determines what kind of 
life gives maximum satisfaction.” For this reason, even the hu-
man being has its nature, that is to say, it has its own ecology 
(order of nature). This also allows us to talk about human 
ecology (Valera, 2013). 
Can an exoskeleton be non-
anthropomorphic?
Before discussing the presence of transhumanism in the 
use of WRs in rehabilitation, we have to settle a linguistic 
question: can an exoskeleton be non-anthropomorphic? Ac-
cording to the definition given in Dollar and Herr (2008), an 
exoskeleton is “an active mechanical device that is essentially 
anthropomorphic in nature, is ‘worn’ by an operator and fits 
closely to his or her body, and works in concert with the oper-
ator’s movements”. Starting from this definition, it would seem 
that a WR would necessarily be anthropomorphic, i.e. it would 
“fit like a glove” to the human figure. Here is the question: does 
the departure from the morphology of the human body neces-
sarily lead to a “dehumanization” of the human being?
To solve this problem we first have to clarify the differ-
ence between “form” and “shape”: the former is the translation 
of the Greek word “eidos”, which refers to Plato’s “ideas”, uni-
versal and immutable; the latter is the translation of “morphé”, 
which concerns the “figure”, particular and contingent. The 
problem we have to face is, prima facie, a linguistic one, as Da-
vid Ross (1966, p. 74) points out: 
Form for Aristotle embraces a variety of 
meanings. Sometimes it is used as sensible 
shape, such as when a sculptor is said to im-
pose a new form on his material. But more 
often, perhaps, it is thought of as something 
which is an object of thought rather than of 
sense, as the inner nature of a thing which 
is expressed in the definition, the plan of his 
structure. […] On the whole, morphé points 
to sensible shape and eidos to intelligible 
structure, and the latter is the main element 
in Aristotle’s notion of form. 
Continuing with Aristotle, we could conclude that an 
eidos (form) requires a certain morphé (shape) and a certain 
kind of chemical constitution, whereas a certain shape is not 
a necessary condition for the form (Marcos, 2012, p. 64-66). 
That is to say, a change in the form necessarily implies a mod-
ification in the shape, while a modification in the shape does 
not necessarily imply a change in the form. Though the shape 
is accidental, the form is essential, as Aristotle highlights: “If 
we turn from artifacts to organisms, it is even clearer that 
form cannot be just the same as shape. For the same organism 
can change its shape many times in its life; if Aristotle think 
loss of the form is destruction of the organism, he cannot al-
low it to change its form as often as it changes its shape. The 
form must be the right sort of thing to persist throughout the 
organism’s life and to be the internal origin of change” (Irwin, 
1988, p. 100). According to this distinction, the departure 
from the morphology of the human body would not neces-
sarily lead to a dehumanization of the human being: we lose 
the shape (something accidental), but we still retain the form 
(something essential).
In this regard, we can talk about non-anthropomorphic 
WRs, which can temporally modify the human shape, even 
without modifying its form: we can say that the robot and the 
human being co-evolve simultaneously, changing their shape. 
A WR, indeed, is a robot for the lower limbs that inte-
grates kinematic, dynamic, and control solutions produced 
by a co-evolutionary optimization process, and custom 
compliant actuators enriching the dynamical properties of 
the robot so that walking arises as an emerging dynamic 
behaviour. Therefore, a WR would imply an open-ended 
design process where both robot morphology and control 
co-evolve and are optimized in a simulation environment, 
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where the dynamical properties of the human body are also 
taken into account. In a sense, the human body and the ro-
bot have to be treated as a symbiotic system (Licklider, 1960; 
Popović, 2015), where the biological and the artificial com-
ponents dynamically interact with one another (meaning 
that they exchange assistive forces), while interacting as a 
single whole with the external environment.
In order to be more dynamic in this co-evolution, WRs 
have to be non-anthropomorphic in their structure, i.e., ro-
bot joints cannot be co-located with human joints, and the 
number of robot links has to be greater than the number of 
the links in human legs. The adoption of a suitable non-an-
thropomorphic structure brings a number of advantages; 
the main ones are: easier wearability, meaning that small 
anthropometric changes are intrinsically compensated by 
the ability of the robot to slightly adapt its configuration, 
thus helping patient’s autonomy and freedom of movement; 
and dynamic advantages, meaning that the heaviest parts 
(actuators) can be located close to the trunk, thus reducing 
the oscillating masses. 
As a consequence of the non-anthropomorphic char-
acter of WRs, their motion does not resemble the human 
gait, although there is still a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween robot and human configurations. By tuning the con-
trol parameters it is possible to modify the type and level of 
assistance, evaluating whether it is acceptable or not, in con-
nection with the patient’s residual motor possibilities. In this 
sense a WR co-evolves with the patient, interacting with the 
human body smoothly and effectively, without inhibiting (or 
interfering with) its autonomy. 
For the reasons discussed so far, these kinds of non-an-
thropomorphic exoskeletons would also be more ecological, 
as they could easily respond to environmental stimuli and 
co-evolve with the subject (they will not force it to make a 
movement, but rather will go along with it). Such WRs are 
ecological in the sense that they help human beings to pre-
serve their own environment, their vital space, as they give 
them back their motility and autonomy: 
In rehabilitation robotics, the term ‘envi-
ronmental control’ refers to a disabled us-
er’s capacity to actively interact with his or 
her external environment […]. When lower 
limb function is also reduced (or lost), the 
physical (and psychological) loss of control 
is profound, and makes a disabled user de-
pendent on others in virtually every respect 
(Dario et al., 1996, p. 48).
A step towards transhumanism?
The last question concerns effects that arise from the 
use of these supporting devices: are they a prelude to trans-
humanism? The question is justified, not so much for the 
advanced technologies embedded in the devices, but rather 
because of the symbiotic relation that emerges between hu-
man beings and WRs (since WRs are specifically designed to 
co-evolve with the patient).
Before addressing the present question, we have to be 
more precise about the term transhumanism: what is trans-
humanism? And what is the difference between transhuman-
ism and posthumanism? Birnbacher (2008, p. 95) seems to 
describe transhumanism as a transitional phase towards a 
complete transformation of humanity: 
‘Transhumanism’ can be defined as a move-
ment that wants us to get on the way to 
‘posthumanity’ by going beyond humanity in 
its present form. Transhumanists want us to 
enter upon a process that will ultimately lead 
to ‘posthumanity’ by attempting, now and in 
the near future, to transcend certain limits in-
herent in the human condition as we know it. 
Therefore, the process that would overcome human-
kind once and for all, leading, by means of technological im-
provement (Valera, 2014, p. 486), to “the perfect [hu]man”, 
to an immortal being, without any limits, would be of the 
transhumanist matrix (Valera and Tambone, 2014, p. 365). 
In this regard, 
contemporary transhumanists argue that hu-
man nature is an unsatisfactory ‘work in prog-
ress’ that should be modified through techno-
logical means where the instrumental benefits 
for individuals outweigh the technological 
risks. This ethic of improvement is premised 
on prospective developments in four areas: 
Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information 
Technology and Cognitive Sciencethe so-
called ‘NBIC’ suite (Roden, 2010).
In order to answer to the previous questionis the use 
of WRs in rehabilitative therapy a prelude to transhuman-
ism?we have to discuss the aim of using WRs, assessing, 
therefore, their ability to achieve this aim. The kind of WRs 
we are considering are designed to restore, as accurately as 
possible, a natural function in human beings: the ability of 
walking (motility). This is, obviously, a good purpose. Howev-
er, there is a thin line between restoring and enhancing: what 
is the difference between the two? In the former, we consider 
human nature as normative, whereas, in the latter, we take 
the will (or wish) as the main criterion of choice. Taking hu-
man nature as a norm similarly means, in this case, fighting 
illnesses and considering them “deviations from the norm”. 
The fight is carried out as an attempt to bring the functions 
back to the initial state and entails a previous medical diag-
nosis and a careful assessment of the patient’s current condi-
tion. We are not talking about exceeding the limits of human 
nature (i.e., human enhancement), but rather, restoring them. 
Not about an instrument that could fulfil human wishes, but 
rather, about recovering motility: this is not, thus, a transhu-
manist aim. 
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Second, we have to remember that WRs are not meant 
to be permanent supports: they are used in rehabilitation 
until human functionality is restored, and not in order to 
achieve a contamination (or hybridization) of the human be-
ing with the robot. 
In this regard, this use is very far from the transhuman-
ist idea, for which “the human body has been left behind and 
humans are free to configure and augment themselves how-
ever they see fit” (Benko, 2005, p. 2) and for which, at the 
same time, “the human is no longer […] the adoption or the 
expression of man but rather the result of a hybridization of 
man with non-human otherness” (Marchesini, 2007, p. 54). 
For these reasons, we can say that the use of WRs for thera-
peutic purposes would not lead to transhumanism, since its 
aim is to restore a function that is “natural” for human beings 
(i.e., motility). 
In a certain sense, if this use of WRs has to do with hu-
man nature, i.e., if it facilitates the development of human 
capabilities, we can also state that it is ecological, since it al-
lows the proper human character to emerge. The use of a WR 
for rehabilitative therapy is ecological as it helps to recover 
a function that is “natural” for the homo sapiens species, since 
a human being who loses its ability to walk is, in a certain 
sense, lost: it wishes to recover this ability, not only in order 
to achieve many other purposes, but also because it is a “walk-
ing being”, as Merleau-Ponty points out. It is more ecological 
for human beings to walk rather than not walk; and to walk 
as human beings usually walk. 
Moreover, this use respects the human dimensions of 
autonomy and freedom. A human being is autonomous and 
free, and, moreover, a human being wants, in every condition, 
to be autonomous and free. That means that human beings 
want to fulfil their purposes, and this means not having con-
straints that prevent them from achieving their goals. In the 
condition we described above, patients with motor disorders 
would be more or less autonomous and free as the WRs per-
mit them. The less constraints they face, the freer they are. 
They do not need an instrument that forces their steps, but 
rather, a structure that sustains them. 
When thinking about the shape of WRs, it is more eco-
logical to have the optimal morphological features, not neces-
sarily resembling those of the human body, in order not to dis-
concert the observer. Recent researches in “pet robot” design 
show that, if a robot looks too much like an appliance, people 
expect little from it; if it looks too human, people expect too 
much from it (Goetz et al., 2003; Saygin et al., 2010). Clear-
ly, none of this is new, since as early as 1970 Mori hypothe-
sized the so-called “uncanny valley” effect (Mori, 1970): “The 
physical appearance of robots that are supposed to communi-
cate, cooperate, and coexist with humans should be designed 
with due consideration of the emotional and psychological 
impact on human observers”. In this regard, “designers should 
seek a moderate level of realism for the physical appearance of 
robots […] in order to avoid falling into the uncanny valley” 
(Seyama and Nagayama, 2007, p. 338). In short, an exoskele-
ton should be non-anthropomorphic because it is not, actu-
ally, a human being.
And last, WRs should really be ecological tools, as they 
assists human beings in recovering their “ecological niche” 
(Umwelt) through the human body, which is the main way 
humans enter into the world (Welt) (Scheler, 2009). 
All these elements lead us to think that it is appropri-
ateat both the ecological and ethical levelsto design 
non-anthropomorphic WRs, in order to respect human ecol-
ogy, i.e., human autonomy and freedom and their relationship 
with the environment. 
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